On the eve of the Second World War, the Danish sociologist Svend Ranulf wrote a study in the history of sociology which he published under the title 'Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism' (1939). It is a stark reminder that sociology has always been in conflict or potential conflict with liberal democracy. August Comte earned a privileged place in Ranulf's text for his attacks on the idea of freedom of conscience and the 'anarchy of opinions' of his time. These make for shocking reading even today. Comte denounced the very idea of a liberal public making decisions based on discussion, ridiculed citizens for forming their own opinions, and called for state control over the dispersion of ideas.
on the belief that the view which will direct government emerges from an independent and spontaneous process. It requires, therefore, the existence failed to act on their knowledge by giving it to the public would be morally culpable. And states which failed to make use of it would have failed to act on behalf of its citizens. These basic liberal premises present a dilemma. If sociology is opinion, that is to say if we put it into the same category as religious dogma, citizens ought not to be forc to subsidize it or have it directed at them. It is no more than state-sponsored propaganda.
Alternatively, if sociology is a science, a science of facts, we may grant it the kind of exemption from this restriction that natural science receives. Sociology can be part of th educational process, and promoted by the state, if it is itself neutral, as facts are. If it is a science that can have its full effect only by being accepted as true, the inculcation that offended Ranulf would be as appropriate as a public health campaign. Sociologists wh dles. pinion ct r of and is thus a violation of neutrality. It also raises a olitica etween as re was such a distinction, and today it is an anti-liberal commonplace to regard schoolbooks and the Yet drawing the line between between fact and opinion leads to endless mud Paul Feyerabend argued, in Science in a Free Society, that science itself was one o among many and thus should not be imposed by the state as dogma, as it is through educational institutions (1978: 91-2, 106-7) . But radically expanding the notion of opinion leads to absurdities, or, more importantly, what appear in given political traditions, to be absurdities. Should the state not teach science at all? If it attempts to be non-dogmatic in the teaching of science, does that mean that such things as creation science need to be taught? Grounding the distinction in the philosophy of science has not proved satisfactory: there are too many different accounts of the boundaries of science to think that any of them can be treated as fact. The very existence of diversity of opinion here poses a problem: unless we think that philosophies of science can be taken to be fa rather than opinion (something assumed, rather strangely, by US Court decisions in cases involving 'Creation Science'). Choosing one over another to draw the line is a matte choosing one opinion over another, (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990, 1994 
The Practice of Political Neutrality
Liberal democracies have steered a complex middle course in the face of these iss encouraging, subsidizing, and granting partial autonomy, a separation from direct political involvement and control, to special institutional structures which support expertise by education and research. 1 Foundations, for example, operate under a 'contract' which allows them to avoid taxes as long as they spend money for charitable purposes: politics in the explicit sense of partisan electoral politics are excluded. But policy studies, advocacy of various kinds, as long as it is not direct advocacy of pendin legislation, and so forth, are allowed, along with traditional charitable activities. What is the rationale for this arrangement? The basic idea is this: it is better for the rich money to charity than to spend it on luxuries or on their heirs, so the state permits the creation of foundations with the incentive of no taxation. In return, the foundations are to comply with the law, with the chance of having their tax free status revoked. The contract with science was this: fund science and leave it alone to determine its research priorities, and in return science would yield results of significant practical value for social needs. This was an instrumental contract. neutrality was dealt with implicitly by virtue of the fact that science, meaning natural science, had its own tradition and a sense of its boundaries. Mert But sociology had its own version of the contract, and its history is essential to understanding the case for 'public sociology'. The implicit deal which has been th of sociology's claim on society has been that supporting sociology as a research and academic discipline will produce results that have a positive effect on societal problems At many points in the past this deal has be
Rockefeller funds in social science in the twenties was understood as a means of improving the quality and capacity for research, which in a few years was expected to be applied to and to have an impact on social problems. When this did not occur, funding was cut (Turner and Turner, 1990: 41-5) .
As an academic subject, so university, and to such bodies as foundations. In the university, fields that conflict w public opinion can survive, even flourish, by attracting students who are skeptica public orthodoxies. And at various times sociology has flourished, precisely in its role a an alternative to public opinion.
ersity provided a kind of soluti ed, d e scussion of professorial political bias is particularly relevant to erkeley sociology and its form of 'public sociology'. The major critic of politically cademic status, David Horowitz, was an associate of some of e present Berkeley faculty in the sixties, when they were all involved in radical politics.
As with foundations, the autonomy of universities is granted under certain conditions, one of which is that they remain outside of politics. In the course of establishing itself as an academic subject, sociology had to draw its own lines in a way that was sufficiently convincing that other scholarly fields accepted it as a legitimate discipline. And the admission of sociology into the univ re on to the problem of neutrality. Within these institutions, the issue is transform but does not vanish. It is often transferred to the specific details of the institutional arrangements themselves. But the logic of political neutrality does not become irrelevant.
There are still boundaries, such as the limits of the tradition of academic freedom, an issues like 'is it education or indoctrination' still arise.
Sociology has, throughout its history, flirted with the boundaries set by these relationships, and has a long internal history of discussing them. A significant part of th background to the current discussion of 'public' sociology is the fact that a discussion has opened up in the United States over the politicization of the universities (Horowitz, 2006) . It is routinely alleged that academics have stepped over the line by producing biased scholarship and teaching and by punishing students who present views in class that are acceptable, even conventional, in the larger body of public discussion, but are treated as false and even excoriated as racist, sexist, and so forth by classroom teachers. 
Burawoy's New Model
The implications of the discussion so far are straightforward enough. It is in his approach to this question that Burawoy comes to a genuinely novel and radical conclusion. But the argument is not made directly. The literature on public sociology begins with a few core ideas: that sociology has gone Left while the world ha gone Right, as Burawoy puts it (2005: 261) ; that sociology has a direct contributi make to democratic discussion that is frustrated by various factors; that en public, especially by critiques of conventional and especially right-wing views, is a moral obligation of sociologists; that sociologists are disadvantaged in the realm of publi debate by the reductive and simplistic character of public discussion (cf. Stacey, 2004) and the lack of respect for sociology, and that other fields have greatly outpaced sociology in the 'public intellectual' market, to the detriment of the field. . 4 The examples he in mind include sociologists' participation in NGOs and social movements, a relatio he suggests is dialogical rather than expert. This is, superficially, a 'liberal' idea; Comte, as we have seen, would have nothing of dialogue.
Burawoy, however, has a novel approach to the problem of neutrality. In addressing this problem, Burawoy is implicitly acknowledging that sociology as an ideological activity-as a discipline with its own value scheme-would be a serious problem for liberal democracy. If 'public sociology set of ideologies with some supporting factual content, subsidizing it would violate th political neutrality of the state, represent an intervention in public discourse on a particular side, and oppress by virtue of coercing citizens to pay for themselves to be subjected to propaganda. This is a trap that arguments for a politicized sociology of the 'Whose Side are we On?' form routinely fall into.
Burawoy, however, is more subtle than this. Rather than rejecting the idea of neutrality outright, he appeals to the idea of neutrality. In a crucial passage, he claims that there is 'no intrinsic normative valence' to the idea of public sociology (2005: means that sociology as a discipline is not responsible for the 'public sociology' commitments and alliances that individual sociologists undertake in the name of sociology and in accordance with their own conscience. We can, in short, recognize a work as a piece of good public sociology while rejecting the values on which it is based.
The legitimacy of sociology, for Burawoy, depends in part on the successes of professional sociology in providing rigorous social research. But it also depends on the dialogic success of public sociologists' organic relations to social movements and to t audiences, especially student audiences, which sociology cultivates a relation to. T re to express themselves in ways tha o of providing the self-understanding of society, in the phrase of Edward Shils, but no longer for society as a whole, but for a society made up of different standpoints.
The Meaning of the Argument
If we read Burawoy as not so much advocating but rather ratifying the new relation of sociology to the political, the significance of the argument becomes clearer. Amer Sociology is understood to be one of many participants in the larger public debates i which a flourishing liberal democracy engages. It is understood as well that there are viewpoints of other, contrary kinds, which are also subsidized and also contribute to competition in the forum of liberal democratic public discussion. Yet public sociology in the organic mode, despite its engaged or standpoint character, may be said to be legitimately part of academic scholarship, and appropriately supported by the state, if it serves the purpose of improving democratic discussion.
advocacy studies that are done by sociologists organically related to social movements are valuable only if they are persuasive, and to be persuasive they need to be up to The former goal of sociology was to get a seat at the table of the sciences; the goal of public sociology is to kibbutz at the table of political discussion. Although
Burawoy does not formally abandon the scientistic aspirations of sociology, he point reminds us that the reign of scientism was brief, partial, and unsuc nd that sociology as a discipline recovered its lost student audience at the same time that e scientistic dream of a coherent, cumulative science evaporated. This is a conception that thus has the virtue of realism about the actual prospects of sociology as viable discipline, which the scientizers never did, as well as solving a problem that the tate.
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